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Metamemory processes depend on different factors across the learning and memory
time-scale. In the laboratory, subjects are often asked to make prospective feeling-of-
knowing (FOK) judgments about target retrievability, or are asked to make retrospective
confidence judgments (RCJs) about the retrieved target. We examined distinct and
shared contributors to metamemory judgments, and how they were built over time.
Eye movements were monitored during a face-scene associative memory task. At test,
participants viewed a studied scene, then rated their FOK that they would remember
the associated face. This was followed by a forced choice recognition test and RCJs.
FOK judgments were less accurate than RCJ judgments, showing that the addition
of mnemonic experience can increase metacognitive accuracy over time. However,
there was also evidence that the given FOK rating influenced RCJs. Turning to eye
movements, initial analyses showed that higher cue fluency was related to both higher
FOKs and higher RCJs. However, further analyses revealed that the effects of the scene
cue on RCJs were mediated by FOKs. Turning to the target, increased viewing time
and faster viewing of the correct associate related to higher FOKs, consistent with the
idea that target accessibility is a basis of FOKs. In contrast, the amount of viewing
directed to the chosen face, regardless of whether it was correct, predicted higher RCJs,
suggesting that choice experience is a significant contributor RCJs. We also examined
covariates of the change in RCJ rating from the FOK rating, and showed that increased
and faster viewing of the chosen face predicted raising one’s confidence above one’s
FOK. Taken together these results suggest that metamemory judgments should not be
thought of only as distinct subjective experiences, but complex processes that interact
and evolve as new psychological bases for subjective experience become available.
Keywords: metamemory, feeling-of-knowing, confidence, recognition, eye tracking, memory, metacognition
Introduction
In our day-to-day functioning, we rely both on our memory, and our knowledge of our memory,
referred to as our metamemory (Nelson and Narens, 1990). For example, we may encounter
someone on the street, and even though we cannot immediately recall his or her name, we may
feel that we know it. This feeling is the result of monitoring our memory. Because we have this
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feeling-of-knowing (FOK), we may continue to rack our brains
for their name, showing that the knowledge of our memory
inﬂuences our behavior. Once we generate a name, we then
monitor and decide if we are conﬁdent enough to use that name,
again showing that our knowledge of our memory inﬂuences our
behavior. Memory monitoring involves evaluating the current
state or ongoing progress of any aspect of memory (Nelson
and Narens, 1990). In the laboratory, memory monitoring
is typically measured by having individuals make subjective
judgments about their memory, and can be assessed during any
stage of learning and remembering. Prospective FOK judgments
require participants to predict their future ability to correctly
recognize some previously learned information (e.g., Shimamura
and Squire, 1986; Maril et al., 2003; Perrotin et al., 2006).
In contrast, retrospective conﬁdence judgments (RCJs), elicited
after participants have indicated their memory response, require
participants to rate the likelihood that they correctly remembered
the target information (e.g., Stretch and Wixted, 1998; Brewer
et al., 2002; Ranganath et al., 2004; Chua et al., 2006). The typical
FOK procedure uses a recall-judgment-recognition paradigm
(Hart, 1965). Participants are ﬁrst presented with a cue and asked
to recall the corresponding target from memory. If they are
unable to do so, they are asked tomake a FOK judgment, followed
by a recognition test. During RCJ tasks, participants are given
a memory test (either recall or recognition), and subsequently
asked to rate their conﬁdence that their response is accurate.
Research has resulted in a general consensus that, when
monitoring memory, individuals use an inferential process to
evaluate whether a particular response will be, or has been,
remembered based on the inputs that are readily available (e.g.,
Schwartz et al., 1997; Koriat, 2008a). However, the particular
inputs that are utilized diﬀer depending on the time at which
memory is assessed (Schwartz et al., 1997). Prospective FOK
judgments are thought to be based on familiarity of the cue
(Metcalfe et al., 1993), accessibility of information about the
target (Koriat, 1993, 1994), or a combination of the two (Koriat
and Levy-Sadot, 2001). In contrast, it is widely accepted that
RCJs are based on the target retrieval experience–that is, the
on-line experience of remembering some previously studied
item (Nelson and Narens, 1990; Chua et al., 2012; Koriat,
2012). In this study, we measured FOKs and RCJs during an
associative recognition memory task, while participants had
their eye movements tracked, in order to examine the sources
of information that form the basis of metamemory judgments
prior to, and following, recognition memory. Our goal was to
examine the extent to which particular factors inﬂuence memory
monitoring judgments across time.
The idea that memory monitoring is a dynamic process is
central to the theoretical framework of metamemory introduced
by Nelson and Narens (1990). According to the model
metacognition contains two interrelated levels, an object level and
a meta-level, which correspond to memory and metamemory,
respectively. Information from the object level is available to
the meta-level via monitoring processes, and the meta-level can
modify the object level via control processes. The idea is that
the meta-level contains a dynamic and imperfect model of the
current state of the object level and, in the case of metamemory,
monitoring is updated on-line while learning and memory
processes occur. Our primary goal was to better understand
this dynamic aspect of memory monitoring, and to that end,
the model makes several predictions. First, we can expect that
FOKs and RCJs depend on diﬀerent inputs because they are
made at diﬀerent times over the course of retrieval. Indeed,
metamemory judgments made at diﬀerent points in time are
often weakly correlated, implying that, at least to some extent,
diﬀerent information is being used as the basis of these judgments
(Leonesio and Nelson, 1990; Schwartz, 1994). Secondly, although
assessing memory at diﬀerent times may depend on diﬀerent
sources of information, there may also be factors that inﬂuence
the construction of the meta-model in similar ways across
learning and remembering. That is, there may be sources of
information that similarly inﬂuence both FOKs and RCJs. Finally,
the model stipulates that monitoring informs the meta-level,
which can subsequently control the object level, resulting in
changes that are dynamically mapped onto the meta-level via
subsequent monitoring. In other words, monitoring that takes
place prior to retrieval might indirectly inﬂuence monitoring that
takes place after retrieval. Therefore we can expect that FOKsmay
inﬂuence RCJs.
Our primary goal and novel contribution was to examine
the dynamic nature of memory monitoring using eye movement
indices of memory to indirectly assess the inﬂuence of available
mnemonic information on FOKs and RCJs, as well as the
inﬂuence of FOKs on RCJs. Although the theoretical model
describes memory monitoring as a dynamic process, few studies
have investigated howmetamemory judgments change over time,
or how multiple factors contribute to metamemory judgments.
Some studies have examined how prospective judgments of
learning (JOLs), another type of metamemory judgment that
has participants predict their future memory performance,
inﬂuenced each other in a multiple trial learning paradigm,
and showed that JOLs inﬂuence each other from trial to trial
(Tauber and Rhodes, 2012; Serra and Ariel, 2014), but they did
not examine diﬀerent types of metamemory judgments. Other
studies have shown that FOKs and RCJs correlate, but did so
in the service of using RCJs to index recollection or mnemonic
strength to better understand FOKs (Hertzog et al., 2010, 2014),
and not to understand the updating of metamemory judgments
over time.We used eyemovements to indirectly measure relevant
factors that are known to contribute to metamemory judgments
because using an indirect measure allowed us to examine several
relevant factors within the same study, and on a continuous scale.
This is in contrast to the majority of work investigating the basis
of metamemory judgments by experimentally manipulating a
single factor, and showing that the manipulation led to increases
or decreases in metamemory accuracy (e.g., Begg et al., 1989;
Koriat and Ma’ayan, 2005). In this study, we did not rely on a
manipulation of a single factor, but instead used eye movement
indices of memory to provide a sensitive measure of multiple
relevant sources of information over time (Chua et al., 2012).
The ﬁrst relevant factor we investigated was the cue used
to elicit a target memory. Much research has focused on the
inﬂuence of cue familiarity or cue ﬂuency on FOKs (Schwartz and
Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993). Increased cue familiarity
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has been consistently shown to lead to higher FOK ratings, even
when there is no corresponding increase in memory accuracy
(Reder, 1987, 1988; Schwartz and Metcalfe, 1992). This eﬀect
appears to be speciﬁc to cue familiarity because increases in
target familiarity had no inﬂuence on FOKs, but did improve
test performance (Schwartz and Metcalfe, 1992). Although the
eﬀects of cue ﬂuency on FOKs have been well studied (Reder and
Ritter, 1992; Schwartz and Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993;
Paynter et al., 2009), less research has been devoted to considering
the role of cue ﬂuency in RCJs (but see, Diller et al., 2001). In
one study, however, Chua et al. (2012) showed that increased
cue familiarity led to increased RCJs. This shared basis begs the
question of whether cue familiarity is an independent inﬂuence
on RCJs, or whether it is mediated by FOKs. In other words,
does cue familiarity inﬂuence the meta-model at the time FOK
is assessed in much the same way as it does at the time RCJ is
assessed, or does cue familiarity inﬂuence FOK, which then exerts
a bias over the RCJ?
To measure cue familiarity, we capitalized on the ability of
eye movements to indirectly measure mnemonic processing (for
review, see Hannula et al., 2010). We used the item reprocessing
eﬀect to examine cue ﬂuency (Althoﬀ and Cohen, 1999; Ryan
et al., 2000). Previous studies have shown that as items are
processed more ﬂuently, typically because of repeated exposure,
participants make longer ﬁxations directed to fewer regions of
the picture compared to initial processing (Althoﬀ and Cohen,
1999; Ryan et al., 2000). We have previously used eye ﬁxations to
demonstrate that cue ﬂuency inﬂuences RCJs (Chua et al., 2012),
and in this study will use it to examine both prospective FOKs
and RCJs.
The next relevant factor we investigated as a basis of
metamemory judgments was partial access to the target. FOK
judgments are thought to be driven by the accessibility of
information about the target (Koriat, 1993). In other words,
when participants fail to recall some target information, their
FOK judgments are based on the amount and ﬂuency of
partial information that is accessed while searching for the
target. Indeed, partial access to various aspects of the to-be-
remembered stimuli, including the emotional content (Schacter
and Worling, 1985; Thomas et al., 2011), and the number of
letters in a string (Koriat, 1993), led to higher FOK judgments.
Further, the latency before recalling partial information has
been shown to correlate with FOKs such that shorter RTs
were associated with higher FOKs suggesting that the ease with
which information is accessed also inﬂuences the FOK (Koriat,
1993).
To measure accessibility we relied on another eye movement
based memory eﬀect, the rapid onset of viewing eﬀect. After a cue
is presented, followed by a forced choice recognition task, the
eyes are automatically drawn to the associated target, and this
can provide an index of associative memory even independent
of an explicit response (Hannula et al., 2007; Richmond and
Nelson, 2009). This viewing eﬀect has also been shown to emerge
rapidly and is thought to be obligatory (Hannula et al., 2007;
Ryan et al., 2007). Thus we can use rapid onset of viewing to
the target as an index of memory, even if the choice diﬀers
from the target. Here we use speed of viewing directed to the
target to test whether FOKs and RCJs are related to target
accessibility.
The last relevant factor that we investigated as a basis of
metamemory judgments is the target recognition experience,
which has been shown to inﬂuence RCJs (Nelson and Narens,
1990; Kelley and Lindsay, 1993; Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996).
Multiple components comprise the target recognition experience.
For example, Kelley and Lindsay (1993) showed that conﬁdence
ratings on a general knowledge test were higher when the
chosen answer had been pre-exposed, suggesting that response
ﬂuency inﬂuenced RCJs, regardless of whether it was correct
or incorrect. Similarly, Chandler (1994) examined whether
the amount of information accessed at retrieval inﬂuenced
conﬁdence. After studying a series of images, participants
viewed a second set of images, which were similar to a subset
of the studied images. During a subsequent recognition test,
RCJs were higher for items from that subset even though
memory performance was impaired. Finally, Busey et al.
(2000) demonstrated that manipulating luminance also aﬀects
conﬁdence, such that brighter faces (as compared to dim) lead to
higher overall conﬁdence. Taken together, these studies support
the idea that the target recognition experience is often used
as a basis of RCJs. Target information that is retrieved more
quickly, more easily, or with more vividness is associated with
higher RCJs than target information that is more eﬀortful to
retrieve (Kelley and Lindsay, 1993; Chandler, 1994; Busey et al.,
2000).
The target recognition experience can also be studied using
eye movements in forced choice paradigms (Hannula and
Ranganath, 2009; Chua et al., 2012). Previous research has shown
a disproportionate viewing eﬀect in that participants look longer
at the studied stimulus compared to the non-studied distractors
(Hannula et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2007). Proportion of viewing
among the diﬀerent choices can be examined in relation to the
correct face (which is chosen for hits and not misses), and also
to the chosen face (which is correct for hits and not misses).
Disproportionate viewing of the correctly chosen target is a
memory eﬀect that occurs above and beyond viewing related to
choice (Hannula et al., 2007), and thus can be used to index
retrieval. Additionally, increased viewing of the chosen stimulus
has been related to choice certainty (Chua et al., 2012). Thus,
we use disproportionate viewing to examine how the recognition
experience relates to metamemory judgments.
In our study, to examine the basis of memory monitoring
at diﬀering points across the learning and memory time scale,
subjects completed a face-scene associative memory task while
having their eye movements monitored (Hannula et al., 2007;
Hannula and Ranganath, 2009; Chua et al., 2012). After studying
face-scene pairs, participants were presented with a scene cue,
and then rated their FOK that they would remember the
associated face. This was followed by a forced choice recognition
test for the face that had been studied with the scene and
retrospective conﬁdence ratings. Using this paradigm we tested
whether eyemovementmeasures of cue ﬂuency, accessibility, and
the recognition experience contributed to FOKs and RCJs. We
further tested whether relevant factors, namely cue ﬂuency, had a
direct inﬂuence on RCJs or were mediated by FOKs.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1206
Chua and Solinger Timing of metacognition
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy English speaking Brooklyn College students participated
in this research in exchange for course credit (1credit/h) or for
pay ($10/h). All participants reported normal or corrected to
normal vision. Only data from 66 participants (47 females/19
males; mean age = 21, range 18–34 years) were analyzed; data
from other participants were excluded because eye position could
not be reliably calibrated, or time constraints and technical
diﬃculties did not allow for suﬃcient data to be collected. Each
participant provided written informed consent in a manner
approved by the Human Research Protection Program at
Brooklyn College.
Behavioral Paradigm
PsychoPy software was used to present stimuli and record
responses (version 1.81; http://www.psychopy.org; Peirce, 2007).
Participants viewed stimuli on a secondary 22′′ monitor with an
integrated eye tracking camera unit controlled by aWindows PC.
Stimuli consisted of 180 full-color face images (90 females/90
males) selected from a previously normed faces database (Althoﬀ
and Cohen, 1999) and 180 full-color scenes from Brand
X© photography. Each face was sized to 256 × 256 pixels and
placed upon a 270× 270 pixels uniform black background; scenes
were sized to 800 × 600 pixels. The size of the face displayed on
the monitor was 9.7 cm × 9.7 cm, and the size of the scenes on
the display was 29.6 cm × 22.2 cm. Nine additional face images
and three additional scene images were used for instruction and
practice of the behavioral paradigm.
Data were obtained in ﬁve blocks, each of which comprised of
an encoding phase and a self-paced three alternative forced choice
recognition (3AFC) test phase that also included assessments of
FOK and conﬁdence (Figure 1). Of the 66 participants included
in the analyses, 39 completed all ﬁve blocks while 19 completed
four blocks due to time constraints. Each study phase consisted of
encoding 36 face-scene pairs (18 female/18 male). The face-scene
combinations were chosen randomly and randomly assigned to
a speciﬁc block. The presentation order of the blocks, as well as
the trials within each block, was independently randomized. Each
study trial began by presenting a scene on the screen for 3000 ms,
followed by a gaze-contingent ﬁxation cross for 500 ms, and then
a face appeared that was superimposed on the scene for 4000 ms.
To ensure that participants attended to each face-scene pair,
participants were instructed to rate howwell they thought the face
“ﬁt” the scene, using the 11 keys across the top of the keyboard
(from the symbol ∼ to the number 0) to indicate responses from
0 to 100 in intervals of 10. Participants were also instructed to try
to remember each face-scene pair for a subsequent memory test.
Each study block was immediately followed by the corresponding
test block, which consisted of 12 trials. Each test trial began by
presenting a previously studied scene on the screen for 3000
msec (scene cue). After seeing the scene, participants made a
FOK judgment on an 11-point percentage scale ranging from
0 to 100 in intervals of 10. Participants were instructed that
a rating of 0 meant they were “absolutely certain” that they
would not recognize the correct face, a rating of 100 meant they
were “absolutely certain” that they would recognize the correct
face, and ratings from 10 to 90 indicated intermediate levels of
certainty. Participants were encouraged to use the entire scale.
This was followed by a gaze-contingent ﬁxation for 500 ms, to
ensure that participants began the 3AFC recognition test with
eye position in the same place and equidistant from each of the
three alternatives. Once a ﬁxation was measured, three faces were
superimposed on the scene, and subjects were asked to indicate,
via button press, which face had been paired with the scene
during the study phase. One of the faces was correct and had
been previously paired with the scene, whereas the other two
had been previously paired with other scenes. Thus each face was
familiar to the participants, and the recognition task could not
be solved on familiarity alone. The correct face appeared in the
left, right, and bottom position an equal number of times across
each block. Participants had a maximum on 10000 ms to indicate
their recognition response. After 10000 ms or the button press
indicating their choice, the trial advanced and participants made
a RCJ, once again, using an 11-point percentage scale ranging
from 0 to 100 in intervals of 10, to indicate how certain they
were that they chose the correct face. Note that each studied face
was only viewed once during the test block, resulting in one–
third of the studied face-scene pairs being tested. The face-scene
pairs were counterbalanced across participants such that each
face-scene pair was tested equally often. Although this paradigm
deviated from the typical recall-judgment-recognition paradigm
used to test FOKs as it did not test for recall of the speciﬁc face
paired with the scene, because faces are hard to verbally label, we
chose to use it because it has been well characterized in terms of
eye movement based memory eﬀects related to conﬁdence and
accuracy (Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula and Ranganath, 2009;
Richmond and Nelson, 2009; Chua et al., 2012).
Eye Tracking Acquisition and Analysis
Eye position was measured using an SMI iView RED eye tracker
(SensoMotoric Instruments, Teltow, Germany) controlled by
iView X version 2.5 software (SensoMotoric Instruments) that
recorded binocularly at a rate of 60 Hz. Prior to the presentation
of the study items, participants’ eye position was calibrated using
ﬁve-point calibration plus validation. If the error in the estimated
position was greater than 0.75◦ of visual angle, the experiment
was stopped and calibration restarted.
We previously used the number of ﬁxations during the
scene cue at test as an indirect measure of cue ﬂuency, with
fewer ﬁxations indexing greater ﬂuency (Chua et al., 2012).
Unlike Chua et al. (2012), in the present study we recorded
eye movements during the study phase, enabling us to calculate
the reprocessing eﬀect. Therefore, we also conducted analyses
using a measure of cue ﬂuency based on the reprocessing eﬀect
(Althoﬀ and Cohen, 1999; Ryan et al., 2000), and indexed cue
ﬂuency based on the diﬀerence in the number of ﬁxations during
the scene cue at study and the scene cue at test. This measure
may better capture the change in ﬂuency for a particular scene
from study to test, with a bigger drop in ﬁxations from study
to test indicating a bigger change in ﬂuency. Furthermore, it
helps account for variation in the number of ﬁxations due to
stimulus diﬀerences. We analyzed data using both the total
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FIGURE 1 | Behavioral Paradigm. Example of three study trials and one cued recognition test trial. During the three-face test display participants made a
three-alternative forced choice recognition decision to indicate which face had been previously paired with the scene. The duration of each trial component at test is
displayed below the corresponding image.
number of ﬁxations and the diﬀerence in ﬁxations from study to
test. Because the analyses showed similar results, we only report
results using the diﬀerence in ﬁxations from study to test as our
measure of cue ﬂuency. Fixations were calculated oﬄine using
SMI’s BeGaze 3.5 Software (Teltow, Germany).
For the 3AFC recognition test, we took an area of interest
approach (AOI), and examined viewing behavior among four
diﬀerent AOIS: the three faces and the scene. For each face, we
characterized the AOI as the Correct Face, Incorrect Face 1, and
Incorrect Face 2. We also characterized an additional face AOI as
the Chosen Face, which was the face indicated via button press by
the participant during the recognition task. For hits the chosen
face was the correct face, and for misses the chosen face was the
incorrectly selected face (i.e., if the correct answer was in position
‘1’ and the participant indicated ‘2,’ the chosen face would be
‘2’). Our primary face AOIs of interest were the Correct Face
and the Chosen Face, and viewing directed toward these faces
were analyzed separately. Analyses of viewing directed to the
correct face provides information about trace access regardless
of behavioral response (Hannula et al., 2007; Richmond and
Nelson, 2009), whereas viewing directed to the chosen face can
reveal diﬀerences in viewing behavior related to the recognition
decision, and also reveal memory eﬀects above and beyond
choice (Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula and Ranganath, 2009). For
our purposes, the proportion of viewing directed at the chosen
face can reveal information about the recognition decision. For
example, we would expect that participants would spend more
time viewing faces selected with high conﬁdence, whereas for
lower conﬁdence responses we would expect participants to
direct viewing more evenly among the choices, resulting in a
lower proportion of viewing to the chosen face. We calculated
the proportion of viewing directed to each AOI based on ﬁxation
durations as an overall metric of viewing behavior.
Previous research using a similar face-scene associative
memory paradigm has indicated that rapid eye movements to the
target face are obligatory and provide evidence of the previously
encoded association (Hannula et al., 2007). Therefore, in addition
to proportion of viewing directed at each AOI, we also examined
how rapidly participants ﬁxated within the AOI and analyzed
whether the onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation in the AOI diﬀered by FOK,
RCJ, or recognition accuracy.
Data Analysis
Two-tailed paired t-tests were used to examine task performance
in terms of recognition andmetamemory performance. Although
participants were instructed to make metamemory judgments on
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a scale ranging from 0 to 100, the actual scale was an 11-point
percentage scale ranging from 0 to 100 in intervals of 10, and thus
metamemory judgments were analyzed on the 11-point scale.
We analyzed the relative accuracy of FOKs and RCJs in
two ways: using the Goodman–Kruskal gamma correlation and
using da, a measure derived from signal-detection theory. We
calculated the Goodman–Kruskal gamma coeﬃcient because,
historically, it has been the most commonly used correlation
to measure metamnemonic accuracy (Nelson, 1984; Gonzalez
and Nelson, 1996). Gamma values range from −1 to 1, with
1 indicating that metamemory judgments perfectly predict
accuracy, 0 indicating no correlation, and −1 indicating that
metamemory judgments negatively predict accuracy. However,
gamma has been criticized and may be less optimal than other
measures because: (1) it treats metamnemonic judgments as an
ordinal measure, thus making it insensitive to diﬀerences in
the magnitude of the judgments (Masson and Rotello, 2009),
(2) it has very low levels of stability across split halves and
alternative forms of tests (Nelson, 1988; Thompson and Mason,
1996), and (3) it does not allow for interval-level interpretations
of the data, which is necessary to accurately assess between
group manipulations or interactions (Benjamin and Diaz, 2008).
Recent research has suggested the use of da, a measure derived
from the signal-detection framework may be superior to gamma
(Benjamin and Diaz, 2008; Toth et al., 2011). Therefore, we also
computed da, a measure based in signal detection theory. To
compute da, we used the procedure described by Benjamin and
Diaz (2008) and used the formula da = √2y0/(1 + m2) where
y0 and m2 represent the y intercept and slope, respectively, of
a normal deviate isosensitivity function. Some researchers use
a similar SDT derived statistic, d′, on metamemory judgments
(sometimes referred to as Type 2 decisions, resulting in Type
2 d′) as a measure of metamnemonic accuracy (Fleming
and Lau, 2014). Both d′ and da can be conceptualized as
distance based measures, and thus range from +∞ to −∞,
with zero representing chance performance. Unlike da, d′
assumes common variance of the underlying distributions—an
assumption that is often found to be incorrect (Swets, 1986). Still,
d′ is commonly used because it can be calculated when the rating
scale has as few as two discrete choices. At least three discrete
choices must be used for calculating da.
Relating Eye Movement Data and Metamemory
As a ﬁrst step, we did two sets of multi-level models, examining
whether diﬀerent eye movement measures covaried with (1)
FOKs and (2) RCJs. As a subsequent analysis step, we examined
whether speciﬁc covariates were still signiﬁcant predictors of
one metamemory judgment, when controlling for the other
metamemory judgment (i.e., RCJs were included as a covariate
in the FOK models and FOKs were included as a covariate in the
RCJ models).
We used multi-level modeling in SPSS 22.0 to model both
trial level and subject level variability in FOKs and RCJs. Trials
in which subjects failed to provide a button response were
excluded. Subjects and stimuli were treated as random eﬀects
with a varying intercept (Judd et al., 2012). All other eﬀects
were ﬁxed eﬀects. Recognition Accuracy was entered as a factor
in the model (hits = 1 and misses = 0). Continuous variables
(e.g., eye movement measures, metamemory ratings) were mean
centered at the subject level, and entered as covariates. Models
were estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Models
were compared using likelihood ratio tests. Signiﬁcant two-way
interactions were followed up using simple slope tests (Aiken
et al., 1991; Dawson, 2013). The simple slopes were evaluated for
hits and misses (values 0 and 1, respectively) and 1 SD above or
below the mean of the independent variable.
In one case, we used mediation analysis on our multilevel
data, taking an approach that combines the dependent variable
and mediator into a stacked variable and then uses that in
the multilevel model (Bauer et al., 2006). We used the mixed
procedure in SPSS, to obtain values for the indirect eﬀect
of the mediator on the dependent variable. To assess the
mediation, a Monte Carlo resampling method was used with
20000 simulations to obtain 95% Conﬁdence Intervals for the
indirect eﬀects using an R web utility (Preacher and Selig, 2010).
Results
Task Performance
Memory Performance
Participants (N = 66) performed well on the recognition
task, choosing the correct face 71% ± 0.02% of the time
(Mean ± SEM).
Metamemory Performance
First we computed the mean FOK and RCJ ratings for both hits
and misses. These data show that both FOKs and RCJs were
meaningfully related to memory in that participants gave higher
ratings (scale 0–10) for hits than misses, for both FOKs [FOK for
hits: 6.77 ± 0.18, FOK for misses: 5.51 ± 0.20, t(65) = 10.70,
p < 0.00001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence for hits and misses
(1.02,1.49)] and RCJs [RCJ for hits: 7.60 ± 0.16, RCJ for misses:
5.05 ± 0.19, t(65) = 15.21, p< 0.00001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence
for hits andmisses (2.21,2.88)]. However, consistent with the idea
that metamnemonic judgments are made online and depend on
diﬀerent inputs at diﬀerent times over the course of retrieval,
compared to FOKs, RCJs were higher for hits [t(65) = 9.67,
p < 0.00001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence between FOKs and
RCJ for hits (0.66,1.0)] and lower for misses [t(65) = 3.38,
p < 0.001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence between FOKs and RCJ
for misses (0.19,0.73)]. Furthermore, the diﬀerence between the
mean metamnemonic judgments for hits and misses was greater
for RCJs than for FOKs [mean diﬀerence for RCJs: 2.59 ± 0.17,
mean diﬀerence for FOKs: 1.29± 0.12, t(65) = 9.67, p< 0.00001,
95% CI of the diﬀerence between FOKs and RCJs (1.04,1.58)],
showing that RCJs made after retrieval better reﬂected the true
diﬀerence between hits and misses than did FOKs elicited prior
to retrieval.
The mean ratings provide compelling evidence that RCJs
better reﬂected true memory than did FOKs, however, that
analysis considers groups of items and does not capture the
accuracy of metamnemonic judgments at the item-by-item
level. Traditionally, the gamma correlation has been used to
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measure relative metamnemonic accuracy, that is, the extent to
which individuals’ metamnemonic judgments reﬂect their own
memory performance for one item relative to another. FOKs
and RCJs were reasonably accurate, as shown by gammas (FOK:
0.43 ± 0.03; RCJ: 0.61 ± 0.03), and RCJs were more accurate
than FOKs [t(65) = 7.05, p < 0.00001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence
between FOKs and RCJs (0.13,0.23)]. Similar to gamma, FOKs
and RCJs were reasonably accurate, as shown by da (FOK:
0.62 ± 0.057; RCJ: 1.12 ± 0.072)1, and RCJs were more accurate
than FOKs, as measured by da [t(64) = 9.14, p< 0.00001, 95% CI
of the diﬀerence between FOKs and RCJs (0.40,0.62)].
Metamemory Judgments Over Time
One way to examine metamemory across the learning and
memory time scale is to examine the diﬀerence in FOKs and
RCJs. As one would expect, metamemory judgments change
with additional mnemonic experience (i.e., retrieval attempts,
weighing of alternatives, and making a recognition decision).
Examination of trial-by-trial changes in ratings (FOK–RCJ)
showed that the recognition experience led to a change in
ratings [t(65) = −9.69, p < 0.00001, 95% CI of FOK–RCJ
(−1.55,−1.02)]; for hits, the level of RCJs were 0.83± 0.09 higher
than FOKs, whereas for misses, RCJs were 0.46± 0.14 lower than
FOKs.
The change in ratings makes it clear that our subjective
evaluation of our memory changes with more mnemonic
experience, but it is also possible that prior metamemory
judgments could inﬂuence subsequent metamemory judgments.
To test this, we used multilevel modeling to examine FOK
rating as a predictor of RCJs, and compared the addition
of this covariate to a model without it. In the ﬁrst model,
we entered recognition accuracy and reaction time, and their
interaction, as covariates. As expected, recognition accuracy and
speed of retrieval were signiﬁcant predictors of RCJs (Table 1).
To test whether FOK ratings also inﬂuenced RCJs, we added
FOK rating to the model. FOK rating was also a signiﬁcant
predictor of RCJs (Table 1). Furthermore, a likelihood ratio test
showed that the model including FOK ratings ﬁt better than the
one without FOK ratings [χ2(1) = 777, p < 0.00001]. Thus,
1Data from 1 subject was not included in the analysis of da because their data did
not allow for the calculation of da.
TABLE 1 | Multi-level modeling of retrospective confidence judgments
(RCJ).
Model Parameter Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL
1 Accuracy −2.00 0.09 3432 −21.39∗∗∗ 15504
RT −0.79 0.35 3373 −22.75∗∗∗
Accuracy × RT 0.37 0.066 3399 5.58∗∗∗
2 Accuracy −1.51 0.085 3424 −17.79∗∗∗ 14727
RT −0.52 0.032 3359 −16.08∗∗∗
Accuracy × RT 0.12 0.06 3405 2.08∗
FOK rating 0.48 0.016 3323 29.74∗∗∗
Accuracy, Recognition accuracy; RT, Reaction time; −2LL, −2 Restricted log
likelihood.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
individuals’ prospective metamemory judgments, combined with
their retrieval experience, predict RCJs.
Eye Movements
Fixations during the Scene Cue and Cue Fluency
Based on prior research suggesting that cue ﬂuency contributes
to FOKs (Schwartz and Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993;
Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 2001) and RCJs (Koriat et al., 2008; Chua
et al., 2012), we capitalized on the reprocessing eﬀect (Althoﬀ and
Cohen, 1999; Ryan et al., 2000) and used the diﬀerence in the
number of ﬁxations to the scene cue at study and test to examine
cue ﬂuency. We used multi-level modeling to examine whether
cue ﬂuency covaried with (1) FOKs and (2) RCJs (Table 2). The
model also included recognition accuracy and the accuracy × cue
ﬂuency interaction. Cue ﬂuency was related to higher FOKs
(p < 0.001) and RCJs (p < 0.001), and there was no signiﬁcant
interaction with accuracy (FOKs: p > 0.9; RCJs: p > 0.2). For
FOKs, cue ﬂuency was still a signiﬁcant predictor (p < 0.001),
even when controlling for RCJs, suggesting that cue ﬂuency
makes a direct contribution to FOKs. However, for RCJs, cue
ﬂuency was no longer a signiﬁcant predictor (p > 0.2) when
controlling for FOKs, suggesting that the inﬂuence of cue ﬂuency
on RCJs may be indirect and occur via prospective metamemory
judgments (Table 2).
To test the idea that the eﬀects of cue ﬂuency on RCJs are
mediated by FOKs, we ran a mediation analysis. When FOK
was included as a mediator, the eﬀect of cue ﬂuency on RCJs
became non-signiﬁcant [b = 0.013 ± 0.015, t(2987) = 0.90,
p> 0.35; Figure 2]. The indirect eﬀect was signiﬁcant, with FOKs
mediating the eﬀect of cue ﬂuency on RCJs (ab: 0.054 ± 0. 0086,
95%CI of ab 0.038, 0.072, Z = 6.34, p< 0.0001).
Viewing Directed to the Correct Face and Target
Accessibility
Target accessibility has been thought to subserve both FOKs
(Koriat, 1993, 1994, 1995) and RCJs (Koriat, 2008b, 2012),
and we examined this using two eye movement measures:
overall proportion of viewing time directed to the correct face
and the onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation to the correct face. We
used multi-level modeling to examine whether each variable
covaried with (1) FOKs and (2) RCJs (Table 3). Each model also
included recognition accuracy and the accuracy × eye movement
interaction.
We ﬁrst examined the relationship between proportion of
viewing directed to the correct face and FOKs (Table 3; Figure 3).
Consistent with the hypothesis that FOKs are related to target
accessibility regardless of whether subsequent recognition is
accurate or not, a higher proportion of viewing directed to the
correct face was associated with higher FOKs for correct and
incorrect recognition (p < 0.001), and there was no signiﬁcant
interaction with accuracy (p > 0.25; Figure 3A). To determine
whether this eﬀect remained when controlling for RCJs, we ran a
subsequent model including RCJs as a covariate; there was only
a trend for higher proportion of viewing directed to the correct
face associating with higher FOKs (p< 0.08).
We also examined the relationship between onset of the ﬁrst
ﬁxation to the correct face and FOKs (Table 3), reasoning that
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TABLE 2 | Multi-level modeling of metamemory judgments by cue fluency (measured as the number of fixations to the scene cue during study minus the
number of fixations to the scene cue at test) and recognition accuracy.
Feeling-of-knowing (FOK) rating Retrospective confidence judgment (RCJ)
Model Parameter Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL
1 Accuracy −1.08 0.086 3404 −12.5∗∗∗ 15412 −2.32 0.095 3426 −24.6∗∗∗ 16109
Cue fluency 0.078 0.017 3340 4.62∗∗∗ 0.063 0.018 3354 3.42∗∗∗
Accuracy × Cue fluency 0.004 0.031 3343 0.117 −0.040 0.034 3361 −1.18
2 Accuracy −0.050 0.081 3403 −0.622 14438 −1.74 0.084 3422 −20.93∗∗∗ 15032
Cue fluency 0.053 0.015 3368 3.59∗∗∗ 0.019 0.016 3381 1.18
Accuracy × Cue fluency 0.018 0.027 3371 0.688 −0.036 0.029 3390 −1.23
FOK 0.55 0.016 3309 34.15∗∗∗
RCJ 0.46 0.014 3385 33.84∗∗∗
Accuracy, Recognition accuracy; −2LL, −2 Restricted log likelihood.
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Feeling-of-Knowing (FOK) judgments mediate the effect of
cue fluency, as measured by the change in fixations to the scene cue
from study to test, on retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs).
Value in parentheses represents the effect of scene fixations on retrospective
confidence when FOKs are not modeled as a mediator. ∗∗∗p < 0.0001.
the speed of memory-based attentional capture indexed target
accessibility (Hannula et al., 2007; Richmond and Nelson, 2009).
Like the proportion of viewing to the correct face, analyses of
onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation to the correct face were consistent with
the hypothesis that FOKs are related to target accessibility. Faster
onsets of the ﬁrst ﬁxation to the correct face were associated with
higher FOKs for correct and incorrect recognition (p < 0.05),
and there was no signiﬁcant interaction with accuracy (p> 0.07).
As shown by subsequent models that included RCJs as a
covariate, faster onsets of the ﬁrst ﬁxation to the correct face
was still associated with higher FOKs when controlling for RCJs
(p < 0.05; Table 3), and there was no interaction with accuracy
(p> 0.1).
We next examined the relationship between proportion
of viewing directed to the correct face and RCJs (Table 3;
Figure 3B). Demonstrating that RCJs for correct and incorrect
recognition have diﬀerent relationships to target accessibility
(Figure 3B), there was a signiﬁcant accuracy × proportion of
TABLE 3 | Multi-level modeling of metamemory judgments by viewing directed to the correct face and recognition accuracy.
Feeling-of-knowing (FOK) rating Retrospective confidence judgment (RCJ)
Model Parameter Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL
1 Accuracy −0.89 0.10 3384 −8.55∗∗∗ 15405 −2.15 0.11 3415 −18.91∗∗∗ 15955
PropVT correct 1.66 0.28 3358 5.87∗∗∗ 2.70 0.31 3377 8.75∗∗∗
Accuracy × PropVT correct −0.63 0.56 3342 −1.13 −2.33 0.61 3366 −3.83∗∗∗
2 Accuracy 0.051 0.096 3389 0.54 14454 −1.68 0.10 3424 −16.81∗∗∗ 14988
PropVT correct 0.44 0.25 3378 1.78 1.82 0.27 3395 6.78∗∗∗
Accuracy × PropVT correct 0.41 0.49 3367 0.85 −2.08 0.53 3395 −3.93∗∗∗
FOK 0.54 0.016 3284 33.79∗∗∗
RCJ 0.46 0.014 3387 33.37∗∗∗
3 Accuracy −1.10 0.086 3399 −12.74∗∗∗ 15438 −2.33 0.095 3424 −24.65∗∗∗ 16030
First fix ons correct −0.00021 0.000090 3365 −2.34∗ −0.00012 0.00010 3379 −1.26
Accuracy × First fix ons Correct 0.00026 0.00015 3321 1.79 0.00016 0.00016 3338 0.99
4 Accuracy −0.066 0.081 3398 −0.81 14456 −1.73 0.084 3421 −20.70∗∗∗ 15034
First fix ons correct −0.00016 0.000078 3388 −2.10∗ 0.000001 0.000085 3390 0.013
Accuracy × First fix ons correct 0.00019 0.00013 3351 1.48 −0.000003 0.00014 3374 0.021
FOK 0.55 0.016 3292 34.37∗∗∗
RCJ 0.46 0.014 3385 34.00∗∗∗
Accuracy, Recognition accuracy; −2LL, −2 Restricted log likelihood; PropVT, proportion of viewing; First fix ons, onset of the first fixation.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 3 | The estimated relationship between proportion of
viewing to the correct/chosen face and metamemory judgments.
Correct responses are shown in solid lines and incorrect responses in
dashed lines. A higher proportion of viewing directed to the correct
face was associated with higher FOK judgments for correct and
incorrect recognition (A), but was associated with higher RCJs for
correct recognition only (B). In contrast, a higher proportion of viewing
directed to the chosen face was associated with higher FOK judgments
for correct recognition only (C), but was associated with higher RCJs
for correct and incorrect recognition (D). PropVT Correct = Proportion
of Viewing Time directed to the Correct Face; PropVT Chosen =
Proportion of Viewing Time directed to the Chosen Face.
viewing directed to the correct face interaction (p < 0.001) such
that increased viewing led to higher RCJs for correct recognition
[B = 2.70; t(3451) = 4.87, p < 0.001], but not incorrect
recognition [B = 0.370; t(3451) = 0.435, p > 0.65]. As shown
by subsequent models that included FOKs as a covariate, this
eﬀect remained when controlling for FOKs (p < 0.001; Table 3).
Also consistent with the idea that RCJs are not based on target
accessibility, the onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation to the correct face
was not a signiﬁcant predictor of RCJs (p > 0.2), nor was its
interaction with accuracy (p> 0.3; Table 3).
Viewing Directed to the Chosen Face
To determine the inﬂuence of the ease of the recognition decision
on FOKs and RCJs, we examined the proportion of viewing
directed to the chosen face and the onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation
to the chosen face (Table 4). The chosen face was the face that
the subject indicated via button press to be the face that was
originally paired with the scene. It is worth noting that for correct
recognition, the chosen face, and the correct face are the same,
whereas for incorrect responses, the chosen face was an incorrect
face. Thus the values for the proportion of viewing and onset
of the ﬁrst ﬁxation directed to the correct and chosen face are
the same for correct recognition, but not incorrect recognition.
Therefore, the added value of examining how these viewing
measures directed to the chosen face relate to metamemory
judgments is for incorrect recognition.
For FOKs (Table 4; Figure 3C), there was a signiﬁcant
viewing directed to the chosen face × accuracy interaction
(p < 0.001) such that a higher proportion viewing of the chosen
face was associated with higher FOKs for correct recognition
[B = 1.78; t(3451) = 3.34, p < 0.001], but not incorrect
recognition [B = 0.021; t(3451) = 0.026, p > 0.95; Figure 3C].
This interaction remained signiﬁcant when controlling for RCJs
(p < 0.005). This suggests that recognition choice does not
signiﬁcantly relate to FOKs overall, and is consistent with the idea
that FOKs are related to target accessibility (see section Viewing
Directed to the Correct Face and Target Accessibility) rather than
accessibility of any choice.
To further test whether FOKs were related to accessibility of
any choice, we examined the relationship between onset of the
ﬁrst ﬁxation to the chosen face and FOKs. Faster onsets of the
ﬁrst ﬁxation to the chosen face were associated with higher FOKs
(p < 0.05; Table 3), and did not interact with accuracy, and this
remained signiﬁcant when controlling for RCJs (p< 0.05). Unlike
our previous analyses of the proportion of viewing directed to the
chosen face, the ﬁnding that there is faster viewing of the chosen
face, regardless of accuracy, is more consistent with partial access
theories of FOK.
We also examined viewing directed to the chosen face for RCJs
(Table 4; Figure 3D). The proportion of viewing directed to the
chosen face was associated with higher RCJs overall (p < 0.001;
Figure 3D), and did not signiﬁcantly interact with accuracy
(p > 0.06). When controlling for FOKs, the main eﬀect, with
increased viewing directed to the chosen face predicting higher
RCJs for correct and incorrect recognition, remained signiﬁcant
(p< 0.001). Although overall proportion of viewing to the chosen
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TABLE 4 | Multi-level modeling of metamemory judgments by viewing directed to the chosen face and recognition accuracy.
Feeling-of-knowing (FOK) rating Retrospective confidence judgment (RCJ)
Model Parameter Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL
1 Accuracy −1.08 0.87 3402 −12.40∗∗∗ 15404 −2.24 0.095 3427 −23.61∗∗∗ 15932
PropVT chosen 1.78 0.28 3354 6.27∗∗∗ 2.88 0.31 3371 9.36∗∗∗
Accuracy × PropVT chosen −1.76 0.53 3346 −3.30∗∗∗ −1.07 0.58 3366 −1.85
2 Accuracy −0.10 0.082 3402 −1.18 14452 −1.66 0.084 3421 −19.71∗∗∗ 14964
PropVT chosen 0.49 0.25 3374 1.96∗ 1.95 0.27 3391 7.23∗∗∗
Accuracy × PropVT chosen −1.30 0.46 3372 −2.80∗∗ −0.15 0.50 3394 −0.29
FOK 0.54 0.16 3282 33.79∗∗∗
RCJ 0.46 0.014 3389 33.38∗∗∗
3 Accuracy −1.10 0.086 3402 −12.74∗∗∗ 15437 −2.33 0.094 3426 −24.68∗∗∗ 16029
First fix ons chosen −0.00022 0.000090 3363 −2.46∗ −0.00013 0.00010 3376 −1.35
Accuracy × First fix ons chosen 0.000085 0.00016 3350 0.55 0.000016 0.00017 3366 0.092
4 Accuracy −0.066 0.081 3400 −0.81 14456 −1.73 0.084 3421 −20.74∗∗∗ 15034
First fix ons chosen −0.00017 0.000078 3387 −2.18∗ −0.000002 0.000085 3389 −0.025
Accuracy × First fix ons chosen 0.000090 0.00014 3378 0.51 −0.000046 0.00015 3393 −0.31
FOK 0.55 0.016 3293 34.35∗∗∗
RCJ 0.46 0.014 3385 33.98∗∗∗
Accuracy, Recognition accuracy; −2LL, −2 Restricted log likelihood; PropVT Chosen, proportion of viewing to the chosen face; First fix ons Chosen, onset of the first
fixation to the chosen face.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
face was a signiﬁcant predictor of RCJs, the onset of the ﬁrst
ﬁxation to the chosen face was not (p > 0.2). Nevertheless, the
ﬁndings that increased viewing of the chosen face is associated
with higher RCJs is consistent with the idea that recognition
conﬁdence is based, at least in part, on the ease of decision-
making and choice behavior.
Changes in Metamemory Judgments
Given that FOKs inﬂuence RCJs, one question that arises is
what leads to changing one’s rating of certainty after making
that ﬁrst metamemory judgment. That is, if you’ve given an
FOK of 7, what would happen during recognition that would
lead to lowering one’s conﬁdence to a 5, maintaining one’s
conﬁdence at a 7, or raising it to a 10. To examine this we
constructed a model with the change in metamemory rating
(FOK–RCJ) as the dependent variable, and included diﬀerent
factors related to target accessibility and the recognition decision
as predictors (Table 5). In one model, we focused on viewing
directed to the correct face to examine target accessibility, and
entered the proportion of viewing directed to the correct face,
its interaction with accuracy, the onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation to the
correct face, its interaction with accuracy, the initial FOK rating,
and recognition accuracy in the model. In addition to accuracy
(p < 0.001) and FOKs (p < 0.001) being signiﬁcant predictors
of the change in metamemory rating, increased viewing of
the correct face interacted with accuracy such that for hits it
led to raising one’s RCJ higher than the FOK [B = −2.32,
t(3448) = −4.34, p < 0.001] and for misses it had no eﬀect
[B = 0.28, t(3448) = 0.33, p> 0.7]. There was also an interaction
of ﬁrst ﬁxation onset to the correct face and accuracy (p < 0.05),
but the simple slopes were not signiﬁcant. Thus, more accurate
conﬁdence judgments (i.e., those where higher conﬁdence ratings
are given to hits) are based on target accessibility, whereas less
accurate conﬁdence ratings (i.e., those where higher conﬁdence
ratings are given to misses) are not.
We also examined the possibility that information related to
the recognition decision was driving the change in conﬁdence
for both hits and misses, and therefore, we focused on viewing
directed to the chosen face. We constructed a second model
with the change in metamemory rating (FOK–RCJ) as the
dependent variable, and entered the proportion of viewing
directed to the chosen face, its interaction with accuracy, the
onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation to the chosen face, its interaction
with accuracy, the initial FOK rating, and recognition accuracy
in the model. In addition to accuracy (p < 0.001) and FOKs
(p < 0.001) being signiﬁcant predictors, increased (p < 0.001)
and faster (p < 0.001) looking at the chosen face predicted
raising ones conﬁdence above one’s FOK, with no interaction
with accuracy (Table 5). The consistent association of viewing
directed to the chosen face with raising one’s conﬁdence above
the initial FOK is consistent with the idea that, in addition to
target accessibility, the recognition decision-making experience
is driving conﬁdence and, unlike target accessibility, does so
regardless of accuracy.
Discussion
To examine how memory monitoring changes over time, and
the basis for those changes, we used eye movement indices of
memory to examine how cue ﬂuency, target accessibility, and
choice behavior inﬂuence (1) FOKs, and (2) RCJs. We showed
that early metamemory judgments, namely FOKs, are based
on cue ﬂuency and accessibility. Later metamemory judgments,
namely RCJs, are based on the decision-making experience, and
the earlier metamemory judgment.
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TABLE 5 | Multi-level modeling of change in metamemory judgments by viewing directed to correct/chosen face and recognition accuracy.
Change in rating (FOK–RCJ)
Model Parameter Estimate SE ∼df t −2LL
1 Accuracy 1.63 0.10 3448 16.36∗∗∗ 14893
FOK 0.45 0.016 3277 28.27∗∗∗
PropVT correct −2.32 0.30 3409 −7.77∗∗∗
First fix ons corr −0.00032 0.000094 3402 −3.43∗∗∗
Accuracy × PropVT correct 2.60 0.57 3428 4.58∗∗∗
Accuracy × First fix ons correct 0.00035 0.00015 3400 2.31∗
2 Accuracy 1.62 0.083 3454 19.39∗∗∗ 14867
FOK 0.46 0.016 3279 28.47∗∗∗
PropVT chosen −2.39 −0.30 3393 −7.99∗∗∗
First fix onset chosen −0.00033 0.000094 3397 −3.48∗∗∗
Accuracy × PropVT chosen 0.31 0.54 3405 0.56
Accuracy × First fix ons chosen 0.00016 0.00016 3403 1.00
Accuracy, Recognition accuracy; FOK, Feeling-of-knowing; RCJ, Retrospective confidence judgment; −2LL, −2 Restricted log likelihood; PropVT correct, proportion of
viewing to the correct face; First fix ons correct, onset of the first fixation to the correct face; PropVT chosen, proportion of viewing to the chosen face; First fix ons
Chosen, onset of the first fixation to the chosen face.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Feeling-of-Knowing Judgments: Cue Fluency
and Target Access
After viewing a cue, but before the 3AFC recognition test,
participants were asked to indicate their certainty about
their future recognition performance by indicating their
FOK. Consistent with prior research showing that cue-related
processing inﬂuences FOKs (Schwartz and Metcalfe, 1992;
Metcalfe et al., 1993), we showed that a greater change in ﬁxations
to the scene cue from study to test, which indexes more ﬂuent
processing, was related to higher FOKs.
A more controversial basis of FOKs relates to accessibility.
Although early models of FOKs proposed that they were based
on direct access to the target (Metcalfe, 2000), there is evidence
against such an account of FOKs (Koriat, 2000; Koriat and
Levy-Sadot, 2000). Here, we used eye movements directed to
the correct face as an indirect measure of direct access to the
target. Rapid viewing of the correct face is thought to be an
obligatory eﬀect of memory on eye movements (Hannula et al.,
2007; Ryan et al., 2007), and higher FOKs were associated with
faster ﬁxations to the correct face, for both correct and incorrect
responses. Although our measure of target access is indirect, this
is consistent with the idea that for higher FOKs subjects had
access to the target, and this led to faster ﬁxations to the target.
Thus, it appears that direct access can serve as a basis of FOKs.
However, we also showed that faster ﬁxations to the
incorrectly chosen face for misses predicted higher FOKs, which
is diﬃcult for direct access theories to explain. This kind of
illusory FOK, could be based on partial access to the target, but
could also be based on erroneous, yet accessible information. For
example, after viewing a scene cue, a participant might recall that
the target has red hair and, as a result, give a high FOK, and look
more quickly to a target with red hair, even if the correct face has
brown hair. In such a case, the FOK appears to be based on the
amount or ﬂuency of accessible information, which is diﬀerent
than direct access to the target (Koriat, 1995). Thus it appears
that tomake FOKs, individualsmaymonitor accessibility without
respect to accuracy (Koriat, 1995, 2000; Koriat and Levy-Sadot,
2001). However, not all accessible features will increase FOKs;
the information must be relevant and meaningful (Thomas et al.,
2012). For example, if a person recognizes a scene, theymay recall
they imagined the individual acting in the scene, “I remember
imagining the face picking the corn in the ﬁeld,” but an individual
may not use this information as the basis of their FOK if they
recognize that remembering the action does not indicate whether
they will remember the face. Overall, it appears that FOKs are
based on accessibility of information, but this access does not
necessarily have to be accurate.
One consideration for our ﬁndings is that typical FOK
paradigms use a Recall-Judgment-Recognition format (Hart,
1965), and FOKs are made about unrecallable items only (Nelson
and Narens, 1990). In our paradigm, we did not explicitly test for
recall, and participants made a FOK judgment after every trial.
Because participants were presented with a scene cue, and likely
attempted to recall the associated face, we may have some trials
in which participants recalled the face associated with the scene.
This could explain why we get faster ﬁxations to the target face.
Although this poses some limitation for comparisons with other
studies, it is unlikely to change our interpretation of the basis
for FOKs. First, our analyses were based on continuous variables
ranging from 0 to 10, and tested for linear eﬀects, so it is unlikely
that recalled items, which presumably would be given the highest
FOK rating, would alter our results. Second, because our ﬁndings
are consistent for both correct and incorrect recognition, it seems
unlikely that removing successfully recalled items would change
the results.
Retrospective Judgments: FOK and Choice
Experience
Whereas most studies examine FOKs and RCJs in isolation,
we examined metamemory judgments across time. Our
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results showed that FOKs predict RCJs, which suggests that
a participant’s expectations about his or her performance
inﬂuenced his or her conﬁdence. At face value, FOKs appear to
measure expected performance. Empirically, they have also been
related to beliefs about what should be known (i.e., expectations)
in the general knowledge domain (Costermans et al., 1992;
Marquié and Huet, 2000). As one might expect given that FOKs
predict conﬁdence, general beliefs about ability have been shown
to predict conﬁdence in both general knowledge and eyewitness
memory paradigms (Perfect, 2004). The eﬀects of expectations
on conﬁdence have also been tested more directly. For example,
using an episodic memory cueing paradigm, participants were
told that a stimulus was either “Likely Old” or “Likely New,”
and when this “Likely Old” cue was invalid, participants had
decreased conﬁdence in correct rejections (i.e., saying the item
was new) compared to when the cue was “Likely New” (Jaeger
et al., 2012). Thus, our ﬁndings that FOKs inﬂuence conﬁdence
are consistent with prior research showing that, in some cases,
expectations can inﬂuence conﬁdence.
The fact that expectations inﬂuence conﬁdence may have
relevance for ﬁndings showing that cue-related processing
inﬂuences conﬁdence (e.g., Koriat et al., 2008; Chua et al., 2012)
because it suggests that the eﬀect of cues on conﬁdence may
be indirect. Indeed, in our analyses, we initially showed that
cue ﬂuency predicted RCJs. However, subsequent mediation
analyses revealed this was an indirect eﬀect, with FOKsmediating
the eﬀect of cue ﬂuency on conﬁdence. This mediating eﬀect
is unlikely to rely on explicit FOK judgments; in a previous
study, using a similar paradigm, but without FOK judgments,
we showed that ﬁxations to the scene cue predicted conﬁdence
(Chua et al., 2012). Similarly, general knowledge tasks, which
show domain speciﬁc increases in conﬁdence (Marquié and
Huet, 2000), suggest that the eﬀects of domain familiarity may
be indirect in that participants give higher conﬁdence ratings
because they expect to know more in that domain.
The idea that expectations, or prospective metamemory
judgments, can inﬂuence retrospective memory judgments may
relate broadly to ﬁndings that metamemory judgments are
inferential in nature (Schwartz et al., 1997; Koriat et al., 2008;
Koriat and Ackerman, 2010). An FOK judgment may be another
source of information that people use when making inferential
RCJs. Work examining memory for deceptive and non-deceptive
items, in which the deceptive information is based on gist
or partial access has consistently shown that gist or partial
access leads to higher retrospective conﬁdence and decreased
metacognitive accuracy (Brewer and Sampaio, 2006, 2012). What
drives this eﬀect is the inference that gist or partial access relates
to accuracy. Because FOKs may also be based on partial access
(Koriat, 1994), it is reasonable to think that participants may
make the same inference that FOKs relate to accuracy.
Clearly, expectations are not the only basis for retrospective
conﬁdence; the recognition experience is a major contributor to
conﬁdence (Koriat et al., 2008; Koriat and Ackerman, 2010; Chua
et al., 2012). This makes intuitive sense, and we also show that
participants raise or lower their conﬁdence after their recognition
experience, and that RCJs are more accurate than FOKs (Watier
and Collin, 2011). Furthermore, when we control for FOKs, the
only covariates that signiﬁcantly predict RCJs, or changing one’s
metamemory rating, relate to the recognition experience. The
variables that predicted conﬁdence, and did not interact with
accuracy, all related to choice behavior, namely the proportion
of viewing time and the onset of the ﬁrst ﬁxation directed to the
chosen face. Viewing directed to the correct face did not vary by
conﬁdence for incorrect recognition responses. Thus it appears
that conﬁdence comes from decision-making behavior rather
than direct access to the memory trace alone. This is consistent
with experience-based models of RCJs (Koriat et al., 2008) in
that the online feedback about the recognition experience, as
indexed by eye movements, predicted conﬁdence, and changes
in metamemory ratings. One recent experience-based model, the
self-consistency model of conﬁdence, proposes that conﬁdence
in forced choice tasks comes from the evidence for the choice
based on the amount of conﬂict experienced when making a
decision (Koriat, 2012), and our ﬁndings that conﬁdence for
correct and incorrect recognition tracks viewing of the chosen
face is consistent with this.
Additional merits to the self-consistency model of conﬁdence is
that it may also explain the correlation between FOKs and RCJs.
The model posits that conﬁdence tracks reliability (Koriat, 2012).
Reliability would come from consistent mnemonic information
retrieved during the scene cue period, which would form the
basis of the FOK, and the recognition task, which forms the
basis of RCJs. To call on our earlier example, if the scene cue
elicited a memory of a person with red hair, and there was
a red haired individual on the three-face display, one might
have higher conﬁdence because there was consistency across
time. If there were no individual with red hair in the three-
face display, the participant might then drastically lower his or
her conﬁdence. Thus, an alternative explanation for why FOKs
predict conﬁdence is that conﬁrmatory evidence over multiple
time points leads to higher conﬁdence (Koriat, 2012).
It is also possible that individual diﬀerences in motivation,
beliefs, and biases could drive the relationship between FOKs
and RCJs. One such bias may be the conﬁrmation bias,
which has some commonalities the self-consistency model of
conﬁdence (Koriat, 2012), in which individuals selectively look
for information that conﬁrm their hypotheses (Nickerson, 1998),
and which there are known to be individual diﬀerences (Rassin,
2008). Similarly, individual diﬀerences in beliefs about one’s
memory (Lineweaver and Hertzog, 1998; Magnussen et al., 2006)
may also inﬂuence the degree to which participants are willing to
update their conﬁdence judgments based on the target retrieval
experience. These beliefs may apply across the learning and
memory timescale, and similarly bias individuals’ FOKs and
RCJs. Our study did not involve any manipulation that might
aﬀect participants’ eﬀorts to be consistent nor measure individual
diﬀerences in biases, but this idea should be considered in future
research.
Another reason that prospective and retrospective
metamemory ratings may interact is that they share a common
neural basis (Chua et al., 2009; Ryals et al., 2015). For example,
recent fMRI work has shown that the act of making FOKs and
RCJs shows common activation compared to other memory
and non-memory tasks (Chua et al., 2009). Furthermore,
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experimental manipulation of brain activity by theta burst
TMS over the frontopolar cortex selectively improved both
prospective (in this case JOLs) and retrospective metamemory
judgments (Ryals et al., 2015), indicating a shared neural basis
for metamemory judgments that occur at diﬀerent times across
the learning and memory timescale.
It is worth mentioning that, in this study, viewing directed
to the chosen face was indicative of conﬁdence for both correct
and incorrect recognition, unlike in our previous study (Chua
et al., 2012), in which it tracked conﬁdence for correct responses
only. Diﬀerences in the paradigm and analyses may explain the
discrepancy. In this study, we used a larger response scale and
analyzed conﬁdence as a continuous variable, whereas in the
previous study we examined conﬁdence as high, medium, and
low. Additionally, in our previous study examined diﬀerences for
a set period of time, whereas in this study, we examined viewing
before the recognition response, which may have increased our
sensitivity to detect eﬀects.
Conclusion
Memory monitoring is an ongoing process that that involves a
dynamic model that changes across time. Memory monitoring
assessed prior to recognition is based on cue ﬂuency, and
target accessibility leads participants to have expectations
about their future performance. The experience during
the recognition task, in particular the experience related
to choice behavior, gives rise to subjective feelings of
conﬁdence in one’s answer. However, the target recognition
experience only accounts for some of the variance, and one’s
metamemory judgment prior to recognition also inﬂuences
their metamemory judgment following recognition. These
results indicate that metamemory judgments should not be
thought of as distinct subjective experiences in time but as an
evolving awareness that incorporates the past metamnemonic
judgments with new information into a dynamic model of
memory.
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